for simplicity we assume that each node adds 20 µs delay, which is supported by commercially available switches. Fig. 1a shows that the network maintains content accessibility for all nodes under attacks cutting up to 20% of the links. For more than 20% of the links cut, several nodes become unable to connect to a replica, even when 4 replicas are placed in the network. The latency results presented in Fig. 1b-1d focus on the case when up to 20% of links are cut and all nodes still have accessibility to content. In the single replica case, cutting 20% of the links doubles the average distance to replica (Fig. 1b) , the average number of hops (Fig. 1c) , and the total latency to replica (Fig. 1d) . For 2 and 3 replicas, the latency degrades by 38% and 48%, respectively, while with 4 replicas the latency degradation amounts to 34%. Given that latency-sensitive applications can require latency in the order of 20 ms [1] , propagation and switching latency account for 10% of the maximum latency under normal network working conditions. Under attacks, such latency can account for up to 20% of the maximum allowed value. Considering cloud processing and other factors that also contribute to the overall latency, current networks are operating at the limit of the latency requirements, and the increase caused by attacks can be the tipping factor causing the network to fail to meet the latency requirements. 
